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Abstract* 
We study the issues in determining regulatory capital requirements using 
advanced modeling by assessing and comparing capital requirements under 
the two alternative approaches. A dynamic financial analysis (DFA) model is 
used for this case study. These issues are of current international interest as 
regulators, insurers, and actuaries face the significant issues involved with the 
introduction of risk-based capital for insurers. 
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Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Capital is defined as the excess of the value of an insurer's assets 
over the value of its liabilities. In practice, the value of the assets and 
liabilities is reported using statutory and regulatory requirements. Reg-
ulatory requirements are used for solvency assessment. Methods of de-
termining economic capital have become the focus of insurers in recent 
years. Regulatory capital requirements for banks and insurers increas-
ingly are becoming risk-based to reflect the economic impact of balance 
sheet risks. Giese (2003) discusses the concept of economic capital 
along with the recent developments in economic capital models. 
However determined, capital provides a buffer that allows insurers 
to pay claims even when losses exceed expectations or asset returns fall 
below expectations. As described by the IAA (International Actuarial 
Association) Insurer Solvency Assessment Working Party (2004) a level 
of capital provides, among other things, a "rainy day fund, so when bad 
things happen, there is money to cover it." 
Cummins (1988) and Butsic (1994) discuss the need for regulation in 
insurance. Butsic (1994) argues that if markets were perfectly efficient, 
capital regulation would not be necessary. Insurers could determine 
their own level of capital, and market forces would price premiums 
depending upon the riskiness of an insurer becoming insolvent. Fully 
informed consumers would diversify their insurance policies across in-
surers taking into account the risk of insurer default. Taylor (1995) and 
Sherris (2003) use economy wide models to explore equilibrium insur-
ance pricing and capitalization. Sherris (2003) shows that in a complete 
and frictionless market model the level of capital will be reflected in the 
market price of premiums for insurance and there is no unique optimal 
level of capital for an insurer. 
In reality the complete and perfect markets assumptions do not 
hold. There is information asymmetry between consumers and insur-
ers. As the costs of insurer insolvency can be significant, insurers do 
not report their level of default risk even though this is often assessed 
by rating agencies. For this form of market failure, as described by 
Frank and Bernanke (2001, pp. 297-312), an efficient way for insurers 
to demonstrate financial soundness is to meet regulated levels of capital 
prescribed. This regulatory capital serves as protection for consumers 
against the adverse effects of insurer insolvency. 
Another factor that is important in practice is the existence of gov-
ernment or industry-based guarantee funds that compensate policy-
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holders in the event of insurer insolvency. There is no formal arrange-
ment of guarantee of insurers in Australia. These guarantee funds are 
taken into account in considering the risk-based capital that insurers 
hold where they exist. They also may generate moral hazard if the cost 
of such guarantee funds is not reflected in the premiums charged to 
insurers. This is an area that is not addressed in detail in this paper. 
If they were to be included in the model, then the capital requirements 
would be the requirements after allowing for the government or indus-
try support. 
The IAA Insurer Solvency Assessment Working Party has developed 
a global framework for risk-based capital for insurers. In their 2004 
working paper entitled "A Global Framework for Insurer Solvency As-
sessment," the working party advocates two methodologies for regu-
latory capital determination: the standard approach and the advanced 
approach. The standard approach applies industry wide risk factor 
charges to the calculation of the insurer~s capital reqUirement, while 
the advanced approach allows insurers to use a dynamic financial anal-
ysis (DFA) model to calculate their capital requirement, better reflecting 
the insurer's risks. 
Banks have been increasingly moving to the use of internal models 
for capital requirements under Basel. l Insurers in a number of coun-
tries will be faced with similar requirements as regulators adopt a more 
risk-based capital approach to regulation. Against this background, the 
issues in implementing risk-based capital are of significant interest to 
insurers and actuaries at an international level. 
1.2 Capital Regulation in Australia 
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) is the pri-
mary capital regulator of non-life (property and casualty) insurers in 
Australia. APRA reviewed its approach to regulating non-life insurance 
companies and recently released a new set of prudential standards. 
These standards contain a new methodology for determining a non-life 
insurer's minimum capital requirement. The new capital requirements 
more closely match regulatory capital to an insurer's risk profile, oth-
erwise known as risk-based capital. 2 
1 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision papers "Operational Risk" (January 
2001), "Overview of the New Basel Capital Accord" (January 2001), and "Working Paper 
on the Regulatory Treatment of Operational Risk" (September 2001). Full details are 
available from the Bank for International Settlements web site <http://bi 5.0 rg>. 
2For further information on the background to the APRA general insurance reform, 
refer to Gray (1999 and 2001) and lAA Insurer Solvency Assessment Working Party 
(2004). 
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Non-life insurers are able to calculate the minimum capital required 
in one of two ways: 
An insurer may choose one of two methods for determin-
ing its minimum capital requirement (MCR). Insurers with 
sufficient resources are encouraged to develop an in-house 
capital measurement model to calculate the MCR (this is re-
ferred to as the internal model based method (IMB)). Use of 
this method, however, will be conditional on APRA's and the 
Treasurer's prior approval and will require insurers to sat-
isfy a range of qualitative and quantitative criteria. Insurers 
that do not use the 1MB method must use the prescribed 
method.3 
APRA's prescribed method is in line with the standard approach of 
the IAA Insurer Solvency Assessment Working Party's, while the 1MB 
method is in line with the advanced approach. The solvency benchmark 
for the new APRA standards is a maximum probability of insolvency in 
a one year time horizon of 0.5%. 
The IAA Insurer Solvency Assessment Working Party considers that 
the prescribed method should produce a more conservative (higher) 
value for the minimum capital requirement, as it should determine a 
minimum level applicable to all insurers licensed to conduct business. 
The 1MB method should produce a lower minimum capital requirement 
but would only be available as a capital calculation methodology to 
larger, more technically able insurers with effective risk management 
programs. 
1.3 The Purpose of this Study 
This paper presents the results of a case study of the assessment 
of regulatory capital for non-life insurers in Australia. The case study 
highlights the issues involved in determining the capital requirements 
advocated by the IAA Insurer Solvency Assessment Working Party and 
demonstrates the challenges of the internal model based approach for 
insurers. It also highlights shortcomings of the prescribed method. The 
comparative levels of capital required under the prescribed method and 
the 1MB method are important for insurers considering the use of in-
ternal model-based methods. Regulators adopt an approach such that 
insurers using either method should meet minimum levels of capital 
3 APRA's Prudential Standard GPS llO. 
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that ensure a consistent probability of insolvency across different in-
surers. This may have shortcomings when the probability of ruin over 
a single year horizon is used as a risk measure. In practice most insur-
ers that develop internal models will consider risk measures that take 
into account the ruin probability and the severity of ruin. It is also im-
portant to consider longer horizons than the one year adopted by the 
regulators and used in this study. 
Our study aims to compare the MCRs under the two methodolo-
gies.4 In order to do this we use techniques that insurers would use 
in practice. The approach used is as follows. We develop a model of 
a typical, large non-life insurer with five business lines: (i) domestic 
motor, (ii) household, (iii) fire and industry-specific risk (ISR) , (iv) pub-
lic liability, and (v) compulsory third party (CTP) insurance. A dynamic 
financial analysis (DFA) model is used for the 1MB method capital re-
quirement, and this is compared to capital levels calculated under the 
prescribed method. The DFAmodel is used to allocate capital to each 
of the risks considered using a method adopted by practitioners. The 
model insurer's business mix, asset mix and business size are changed 
to examine the effect on capital requirements. 
The main results of the analysis are as follows: Based on the liability 
volatility assumptions developed by leading industry consultants, the 
1MB method was found to produce a higher MCR than the prescribed 
method. From the insurer's perspective, this indicates a possible in-
centive to use the prescribed method in practice. It was also found 
that the prescribed method capital requirements were inadequate to 
ensure a ruin probability in one year of less than 0.5% for the entire 
general insurance industry. This illustrates the difficulty in developing 
prescribed method requirements that reflect insurer differences. 
Finally, the liability volatility assumptions have a Significant impact 
on the results produced by the internal model. There was no consensus 
on insurance liability volatility assumptions suitable for capital require-
ments for the Australian business. Consulting firms had developed and 
published estimates using their own experience and knowledge. A rig-
orous study is required to quantify these assumptions more precisely. 
This is an important area for future research. The assumptions adopted 
in this study and examined for sensitivity, however, are the best esti-
mates available. 
From an international perspective this study identifies challenges 
for risk-based capital requirements in insurance. Prescribed methods, 
although easier to apply, are more difficult to develop, especially if con-
4Readers are referred to Collings (2001) and IAA Insurer Solvency Working Party 
(2004) for prior work in this area. 
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sis tent treatment of different insurers is important. On the other hand, 
implementing internal model-based capital requirements requires that 
the issue of the calibration of models and consistency in assumptions 
used for different classes of business be properly addressed. An inter-
nal model can deal with the many interactions between the assets and 
liabilities and many of the most important risks, but this will only be 
the case if the models are based on a sound estimation of risks from 
actual data. This is an area that requires attention before regulators 
can use this approach with the confidence that is necessary for such an 
important aspect of insurer risk management. 
2 The Prophet DFA Model 
This study uses a DFA model to determine the capital requirement 
under the 1MB method. The DFA model used was developed using 
Prophet, a DFA software package produced by Trowbridge Consulting. 
The Prophet DFA model is used by several large non-life insurers in Aus-
tralia for internal management purposes. Other DFA software packages 
commonly used in the Australian non-life insurance industry include 
Igloo (developed by The Quantium Group), Moses (developed by Classic 
Solutions) and TASPC (developed by Tillinghast Towers-Perrin Consult-
ing). Although these various software packages have different features, 
we do not expect significant differences in the results from using a dif-
ferent DFA software package based on the simplified assumptions used 
in the model. 
The Prophet DFA model calibrated for this study uses typical as-
sumptions for this purpose. It was not developed to meet the require-
ments for approval by APRA and the Treasurer for use in the 1MB method. 
The Prophet model is broadly representative of current industry best 
practice in general insurance DFA modeling. 
2.1 Description 
The Prophet DFA model consists of an economic model and an insur-
ance model. The key interaction between the two models is inflation, 
which affects both the asset returns in the economic model and the 
claims and expenses in the insurance model. We describe the main fea-
tures of the DFA model for completeness. Other models will differ in 
details but are broadly similar to the model described here. 
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2.1.1 The Economic Model 
Prophet uses The Smith Model® (TSM®) to model the economic en-
vironment. TSM® is a proprietary economic model that forecasts a 
range of economic variables including bond yields, equity returns, prop-
erty returns, inflation and the exchange rate. The key features of the 
model are that TSM® ensures that all initial prices and projections are 
arbitrage-free and that markets are efficient. Historical data are used to 
calibrate TSM® to derive the necessary parameters for the projections, 
including the risk premium and covariance matrix parameters that en-
sure efficiency in markets.5 We should emphasize that we are not ad-
vocating the use of any particular model or software. We use typical 
software and assumptions as would be used by an insurer in practice in 
order to assess the impact of capital requirements and to draw conclu-
sions about the alternate approaches. The economic model used may 
impact the results through the assumptions made about inflation and 
how this is incorporated into the liability model. 
2.1.2 The Insurance Model 
The insurance model is dis aggregated into separate models for each 
of the insurer's business lines' liabilities. Assets, liabilities not relating 
to a specific line, and interactions between business lines are modeled 
at the insurer entity level. 
Opening Financial Position: The opening financial position for the in-
surer is an input and covers the details of the insurer's liabilities 
and assets. From this opening position projections are simulated 
for the insurer's asset returns, claims for each business line, ex-
penses, and reinsurance recoveries. 
Asset Returns: Asset returns are projected based on the assumed asset 
allocation and the simulations from the economic model. 
Claims: There are four stochastic claims processes in the model: run-
off claims (outstanding claims); new attritionallosses; new large 
claims; and new catastrophe claims. Attritional and large claims 
are modeled separately for each business line, while catastrophe 
claims are modeled by the catastrophe event. 
• Run-off Claims: The opening value for the outstanding claims 
reserve equals the expected discounted value of the inflated 
5For further details on The Smith Model· visit <http://thesmi thmode 1 . com>. 
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run-off claims. The expected run-off claims are input into 
the model in the form of a run-off triangle. For each accident 
year the run-off claims are assumed to follow a lognormal 
distribution with a variance parameter for each business line 
and each accident year as input into the model. 
Run-off patterns used in DFA model case study also are avail-
able from the authors. These were developed from assumed 
industry run-off patterns. A summary of the key factors is 
given in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Cumulative Payment Development 
Patterns by Business Line (Uninflated) 
Business Line 
Period Motor Home F&ISR Pub. Liab. CTP 
1 81% 86% 20% 11% 5% 
2 100% 98% 90% 23% 11% 
3 100% 99% 95% 37% 24% 
4 100% 99% 98% 54% 41% 
5 100% 100% 99% 69% 59% 
6 100% 100% 100% 81% 73% 
7 100% 100% 100% 88% 82% 
8 100% 100% 100% 92% 88% 
9 100% 100% 100% 95% 93% 
10 100% 100% 100% 97% 96% 
11 100% 100% 100% 98% 98% 
12 100% 100% 100% 99% 99% 
13 100% 100% 100% 99% 99% 
14 100% 100% 100% 99% 100% 
15 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Notes: Period = Development Period. F&[SR = Fire & [SR. 
Pub. Liab. = Public Liability . 
• New Attritional Losses: Ultimate attritionallosses from new 
claims are assumed to follow a lognormal distribution. with a 
specified payment pattern. Inflation and superimposed infla-
tion also are included. Correlations between business lines 
are modeled by a specified correlation matrix that is put into 
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the model. Parameters for attritionallosses are given in Table 
2. 
Table 2 
Attritional Claims Parameters 
Lognormal Distribution Claims as a Percentage of GEP 
f.1 (T 
Motor Home F&ISR Pub. Liab. CTP 
-25.4% 
22.4% 
-81.7% 
30.6% 
-70.8% 
26.0% 
-74.8% 
27.0% 
-36.3% 
20.9% 
Notes: F&[SR = Fire & [SR, Pbl. Liab. = Public Liability. 
• New Large Claims: A collective risk model is used to model 
large claims. The frequency of claims is modeled as a Poisson 
process, and a lognormal distribution is used to model large 
claims severity as, for example, in Klugman, Panjer, and Will-
mot (1998, Chapter 4, pp. 291-384). Let Kf be the number of 
large claims for business line i, Xfk the size of the kth large 
claim in business line i, Zf is the aggregate large claims for 
business line i with 
Kf ~ Poisson (Ad 
Xfk ~ Lognormal (f.1i' (Tn 
Kf 
zf = I Xfk 
k=l 
and parameter values given in Table 3. The assumptions 
for the large claims payment pattern, inflation and superim-
posed inflation are identical to those used in the modeling of 
attritional claims. 
• New Catastrophe Claims: Catastrophe claims are modeled 
based upon similar principles to the collective risk model 
with some modifications. Four catastrophe types are mod-
eled separately. For each catastrophe, a Poisson frequency 
process was used to model the number of catastrophe events 
per year, and an empirical distribution was used to model the 
claim severity from the event. For each event, there is a pri-
mary and a secondary severity process modeled, with the pri-
mary process being larger than the secondary process. The 
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Table 3 
Poisson Frequency and Lognormal Severity 
Fire & ISR Public Liability CTP 
A 0.53 1.36 1.42 
/.1 7.72 8.22 8.67 
() 0.46 0.25 0.22 
Notes: F&ISR = Fire & ISR, Pbl. Liab. = Public Liability. 
key difference between the modeling of large and catastro-
phe claims is that catastrophes are considered as events and 
are not specific to any business line. We assume 
KJ ~ Poisson (Aj) 
XJk ~ Empirical Distribution 
YjS I XJk ~ Empirical Distribution. 
Each business line is assigned a fixed percentage of either the 
primary severity or the secondary severity for each catastro-
phe type. 
PCij = pJ X Ai 
SCij = SJ X Bi 
where PCij is the aggregate primary claims for business line 
i from catastrophe type j, 100Ai% of primary severity for 
business line i, pJ is the aggregate primary severity for catas-
KJ 
trophe type j which equals 2:: XJk' SCi} is the aggregate sec-
k=l 
ondary claims for business line i from catastrophe type j, 
100Bi% of secondary severity for business line i, 
KJ 
SJ = I YjS I XJk 
k=l 
is the aggregate secondary severity for catastrophe type j, 
Kf is the number of catastrophe events for catastrophe type 
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j, XJk is the primary severity of the kth event for catastro-
phe type j, and Yj~ I XJk is the secondary severity of the kth 
event for catastrophe type j. Estimated parameters for the 
catastrophe model used in the base case DFA model are as 
follows: 
- for the small catastrophe claims parameters the Poisson 
frequency was i\. = 4.3 and mean and standard deviation 
of the empirical severity of GEP were 0.88% and 0.43%, 
respectively, and 
- the impact to each line of business as percentage of sever-
ity was motor (50%), home (100%), and Fire & ISR (190%). 
The other parameters used are given in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Large Catastrophe Type Claims: 
Parameter Impact on Each Business Line 
Type Motor Home Fire & ISR 
1 % Primary Severity 6 8 
1 % Secondary Severity 64.6 
2 % Primary Severity 9 8 
2 % Secondary Severity 1.6 
3 % Primary Severity 85 84 
3 % Secondary Severity 33.8 
Expenses: There are three categories of expenses in the model: acquisi-
tion expense; commission; and claims handling expense. Acquisi-
tion expense and commission are expressed as a fixed percentage 
of premiums. Claims handling expense is a fixed percentage of 
claims. Expenses vary across business lines. 
Reinsurance: The model allows for individual excess of loss (XoL) rein-
surance to cover large claims and catastrophe reinsurance to cover 
catastrophes. Proportional reinsurance is not explicitly modeled, 
so in effect attritional claims can be viewed to be net of propor-
tional cover. For both reinsurance contracts there is a cost of 
cover, a deductible amount, an upper limit, and a specified num-
ber of reinstatements for the contract. 
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2.2 Key Interactions and Correlations 
An important aspect of DFA modeling is accounting for the many in-
teractions and correlations between variables in the model. It is partic-
ularly important when considering the tail-end of the distribution of in-
surance outcomes given that extreme losses are often driven by several 
variables behaving unfavorably. For example, a one in two hundred year 
loss for an insurer could occur when both a catastrophe event causes 
very high insurance claims and at the same time asset markets under-
perform. In the Prophet DFA model there are four key interactions that 
are modeled: between assets and liabilities; claims and expenses; at-
tritional claims across business lines; and between catastrophe claims 
across business lines. 
Relationship between Assets and Liabilities: Inflation is important in 
the relationship between assets and liabilities. Consumer price 
index (CPI) and average weekly earnings (AWE) inflation are pro-
jected by TSM®. Inflation impacts asset returns, as TSM® assumes 
markets are efficient and incorporates a risk premium and covari-
ance matrix to relate inflation with other asset prices. The impact 
of TSM"'s projected inflation on liabilities is through claims infla-
tion in the insurance model. 
Relationship between Claims and Expenses: Claims handling expen-
ses are modeled as a fixed percentage of claims. Thus, claims 
handling expenses are perfectly correlated with claims incurred. 
Relationship between Attritional Claims across Business Lines: A cor-
relation matrix is specified to model the relationship between the 
attritional claims of different business lines. The parameter val-
ues for the correlation matrix (based on the Tillinghast study) used 
for the DFA study base case are given in Table S. This gives the Pi} 
for the correlation between line of business i and line of business 
j. 
Relationship between Catastrophe Claims across Business Lines: As 
catastrophes are modeled as events that can impact multiple busi-
ness lines, there exists a correlation between catastrophe claims 
across different business lines. For business lines that are im-
pacted by either the primary or secondary severity distribution 
of a given catastrophe event, there will be perfect correlation be-
tween claims from that catastrophe event. In the case where one 
line is impacted by the primary severity distribution and another 
is impacted by the secondary severity distribution, there will be a 
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Table 5 
Parameter Values for the Correlation Matrix 
Motor Home F&ISR Pub. Liab. CTP 
Motor 1.00 0.75 0.40 0.00 0.55 
Home 0.75 1.00 0.35 0.00 0.00 
Fire & ISR 0.40 0.35 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Public Liability 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.35 
CTP 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.35 1.00 
Notes: F&ISR = Fire & ISR, Pub. Liab. = Public Liability. 
positive correlation (but less than one). Lines that are not affected 
by a given catastrophe event will have zero correlation with lines 
that are affected. Modeling of dependence in insurance is a topic 
of current research. We have not included more detailed models 
of dependence in this case study. We aimed to use current in-
dustry practice which is currently largely based on correlations. 
Even using correlations is problematic because there is no current 
agreement on the assumptions to use. 
3 The Data and DFA Model Assumptions 
The data sources used to create the model insurer came from: 
• APRA's June 2002 Selected Statistics on the General Insurance In-
dustry (APRA statistics); 
• Tillinghast's report "Research and Data Analysis Relevant to the 
Development of Standards and Guidelines on Liability Valuation 
for General Insurance;" 
• Trowbridge's report "APRA Risk Margin Analysis;" 
• Allianz Australia Insurance Limited (Allianz); 
• Promina Insurance Australia Limited (Promina); and 
• Insurance Australia Group Limited (lAG). 
The model insurer created is not representative of any of the insur-
ers that provided data for the study. Full details of the model assump-
tions are provided in Sutherland-Wong (2003) and available from the 
authors on request. Brief details are provided below. 
18 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 12, 2005 
The following data items were used for the model insurer: 
Number of Business Lines: Five business lines were included. This 
was considered large enough for an in-depth analysis without un-
duly complicating the analysis. To ensure a broad mix of business 
lines, two of the five were chosen to be short tail (Domestic Motor 
and Household), two long tail (Public Liability and CTP), and one 
of intermediate policy duration (fire and ISR). The largest business 
lines from the APRA statistics (by gross written premium) for each 
of these categories were chosen. 
Size of Business Lines: The business size was set so that the model 
insurer had a 10% market share from the APRA statistics (by gross 
written premiums) in each business line. 
Expected Claims: The expected claims for each line of business were 
set to a level to produce an expected afterctax return of 15% on 
capital based on an assumed capital level of 1.5 times the MCR 
calculated under the prescribed method. The payment pattern, 
premium assumptions, and inflation assumptions were used to 
solve for the expected claims for each business line to meet this 
target. 
Claims Volatility: The volatility assumption used for each business line 
determines the insurance outcome at the 99.5 th percentile and 
therefore directly impacts the MCR. Rather than using individual 
insurer data for these assumptions, we used statistics that were 
more representative of the broader Australian general insurance 
industry. 
The Tillinghast and Trowbridge reports both include estimates of 
the coefficients of variation (CVs) of the insurance liabilities of the 
Australian general insurance industry. The reported CVs in these 
reports were vastly different, however, with the Tillinghast num-
bers being generally twice as large as the Trowbridge numbers. 
Table 6 provides details of CVs used in this DFA case study based 
on the Tillinghast report. 
Thomson (2003) outlines the initial risk margins that insurers 
have adopted since the new standards came in force from July 
2002. He reports that for short tail lines, insurers were generally 
aligned with the lower Trowbridge numbers. For 101l1S tail lines, 
the numbers were consistently lower than the Tillinghast report. 
There was a great deal of variation in the risk margins adopted 
within each business line, however, suggesting that there is no 
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Table 6 
Liability CVs by Business Line 
Type of Liability CV 
Outstanding Claims Premium 
Motor 12.4% 
Home 18.9% 
Fire & ISR 18.9% 
Public Liability 23.7% 
21.7% 
33.1% 
28.4% 
29.6% 
27.2% CTP 21.8% 
real consensus among the industry on the appropriate level for 
risk margins. It generally would be in the interest of insurers to 
adopt lower risk margins in order to report a lower liability value 
and also a lower capital requirement. 
The Tillinghast numbers were used in the analysis, as they rep-
resented a more conservative view of variability in the industry. 
The Trowbridge numbers were used as an alternative scenario in 
the analysis to determine the impact of these assumptions. 
Payment Pattern: The payment pattern data were derived from typical 
insurer data. 
Asset Mix: The asset mix for the model insurer was representative of 
the industry average investment mix. Details on the asset mix 
assumed are given in Table 7 for the base case. 
Table 7 
Asset Mix 
Cash 
Equities 
Fixed Interest 
Index Bonds 
Total 
Proportion 
Invested 
15% 
20% 
55% 
10% 
100% 
Reinsurance: The reinsurance for each business line was based upon 
typical insurer data. For the long tail lines, individual XoL con-
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tracts were designed to cover most of the large claims. For the 
short tail lines (including fire and ISR), catastrophe XoL contracts 
were designed to set the maximum event retention (MER) of the 
insurer to equal $15 million. 
Superimposed Inflation: The external factors that affect the run-off 
claims are inflation and superimposed inflation. The inflation 
level is derived from the economic model, while superimposed 
inflation is modeled as a stochastic two-state process. The super-
imposed inflation process consists of a normal superimposed in-
flation state and a high superimposed inflation state, with a transi-
tion probability matrix determining the movement between these 
two states. The process is described as follows: Let P denote the 
transition probability matrix where Pij is the probability of mov-
ing from state i to state j, IN is the superimposed inflation rate in 
the normal state, IH is the superimposed inflation rate in the high 
state with 
P = (POO POI) 
PIO Pll 
IN ~ U(aN,bN) and IH ~ U(aH,bH). Using typical insurer data, 
the estimated parameter values used in the model are: 
P = (0.9 0.1) 
0.2 0.8 
IN ~ U( -0.02,0.04) and IH ~ U(0.05, 0.15). 
4 Assessment of the DFA model 
The model was designed to broadly represent best practice in apply-
ing DFA models to capital analysis and to be consistent with the way 
that practitioners would model the business lines. The parameters of 
the model were set to capture the features of a typical insurer. The 
model also can be assessed against APRA's Guidance Note GGN 1l0.2, 
which sets out the qualitative and quantitative requirements for an in-
ternal model. The key quantitative risks that an internal model must 
capture, as specified by the Guidance Note, fall under the broad cate-
gories of investment risk, insurance risk, credit risk, and operational 
risk. 
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TSM® is used in Prophet to capture the dynamics of the economic 
market and the subsequent impact on an insurer's investment portfolio. 
While no stochastic asset model currently available is perfect, TSM® is 
representative of best practice in economic forecasting and assessment 
of investment risk. 
The Guidance Note specifies a range of risks relating to the insur-
ance business that need to be included in the model. These risks in-
clude outstanding claims risk, premium risk, loss projection risk, con-
centration risk, and expense risk. Prophet allows for these risks using 
the assumed variability in its three claims processes: attritional, large 
and catastrophe claims. Attritional claims are assumed to follow a log-
normal distribution. This assumption is common industry practice for 
modeling claims. The lognormal assumption can be inadequate for cap-
turing the true variability in claims processes, particularly when analyz-
ing the tail-end of the distribution of claims. Modeling dependencies 
between business lines with a standard (linear) covariance assumption 
may not adequately capture the dependence in tail outcomes. Although 
not commonly used in industry practice, copulas are an increasingly 
useful method of measuring tail dependencies. Venter (2001) and Em-
brechts, McNeil, and Straumann (2000, Chapter 6, pp. 71-76.) provide 
a good coverage of the use of copulas in modeling tail dependencies in 
insurance. 
The Prophet DFA model does attempt to capture the variability in 
claims at the tail-end of the distribution by including separate models 
for large claims and catastrophe claims. Dependencies between busi-
ness lines in these tail outcomes are captured in part by the impact of 
catastrophe events on multiple business lines. The catastrophe model 
has a similarity to frailty models used to construct copulas. How well 
the model captures the tail risk in practice is an empirical issue that 
needs further research. 
Concentration risk is a component of loss projection risk relating 
to the uncertainty of the impact of catastrophic events. This risk is 
accounted for by the catastrophe model. The excess of loss catastrophe 
reinsurance assumptions in the model limit the impact of concentration 
risk. 
Expense risk is accounted for because claims handling expenses are 
expressed as a percentage of claims incurred. Although some unex-
pected expense increases may be independent of the amount of claims, 
there is normally a significant level of correlation between claims and 
claims handling expenses. Assuming expenses and claims are perfectly 
correlated results in a conservative allowance for the expense risk of the 
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insurer-under circumstances in the tail when claims are higher than 
expected, so too will be claims handling expenses. 
Like all businesses, insurers face the credit risk that parties who owe 
money to them may default. For an insurer, the key sources of credit 
risk arise from their investment assets, premium receivables, and rein-
surance recoveries. Credit risk relating to investment assets is implic-
itly covered in The Smith Model. The Prophet DFA model calibrated 
in this study does not account for the risk of default in premiums or 
reinsurance owed. Thus, the MCR calculated by the 1MB method using 
the Prophet DFA model will not include a charge for these risks. To 
compensate for this, in calculating the total MCR for the 1MB method, 
the charge from the prescribed method for outstanding premiums and 
reinsurance recoveries is included. 
Guidance Note GGN 110.2 highlights operational risk as a quantita-
tive risk that should be included in an insurer's capital measurement. 
Operational risk, however, is a particularly difficult risk to quantify and 
is an area of ongoing research in both insurance and banking. APRA's 
prudential standards include a Guidance Note for operational risk, GGN 
220.5, which outlines the qualitative measures an insurer should pur-
sue to manage operational risk, but does not provide any guidance on 
how to quantify the risk for capital calculation. 
The Prophet DFA model calibrated in this study does not account 
for operational risk. There is no well-accepted model nor sufficient data 
and analysis to properly assess insurer operational risk. The prescribed 
method does not have a charge for operational risk. The Basel Commit-
tee's Working Paper on the Regulatory Treatment of Operational Risk 
(2001) reports that operational risk should make up 12% of a bank's 
minimum required capital. Giese (2003) uses a survey of banks and 
non-life insurers to report that on average banks allocate approximately 
30% of their capital to operational risk, while non-life insurers allocate 
approximately 16%. In the absence of an agreed approach to allocating 
capital to operational risk for non-life insurers, however, it was decided 
that no additional charge would be made. Given the comparative na-
ture of this study, this assumption does not impact on the conclusions 
drawn or the significance of the results. 
5 Methodology 
A model insurer was created to be representative of a typical large 
non-life insurer operating in Australia. The Prophet DFA model was 
used to project future insurance outcomes under different assump-
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tions. Six thousand (6000) simulations were performed for each set of 
assumptions and used to estimate the reqnired capital to ensure a ruin 
probability over a one year horizon of 0.5%. The number of simulations 
was determined so that the standard error of the capital requirement 
estimate was small compared to the capital amount. The capital re-
quirement calculated by the Prophet DFA model was then compared to 
the MCR under the prescribed method for the model insurer.6 A sum-
mary of the prescribed method capital charges for Australia is provided 
in Tables 8 and 9. 
Table 8 
Outstanding Claims and Premium Liability 
Capital Charges for Direct Insurers 
Class of 
Business 
Home, Motor, and Travel 
F&ISR and Others 
CTP, Liability, and Professional Indemnity 
Risk Capital Factor 
Outstanding Premium 
Claims Liability 
9% 13.5% 
11% 16.5% 
15% 22.5% 
Notes: Motor includes commercial and domestic; Liability includes public, em-
ployer, and product liabilities; F&ISR and Others include Fire & ISR, Marine, Avia-
tion, Consumer Credit, Mortgage, Accident. 
The following five sets of assumptions were examined to assess their 
impact on different types of insurers with different balance sheet struc-
tures. As the assumptions for the liability volatilities currently used 
differ significantly, it was important to examine the impact of these 
differences. In each case, only the assumption listed is changed from 
the base case. 
6See APRA GPS 110 for the insurance and investment risk capital charges. 
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Table 9 
Investment Capital Charges 
Type of Charge Charge 
Cash and debt obligations of the commonwealth government, 0.5% 
an Australian state or territory government, or the national gov-
ernment of a foreign country where the security has a Grade 1 
counterparty rating or, if not rated, the long-term foreign cur-
rency counterparty rating of that country is Grade 1; GST re-
ceivables (input tax credits); 
Any debt obligation that matures or is redeemable in less than 1.0% 
one year with a Grade 1 or 2 rating; cash management trusts 
with a Grade 1 or 2 rating; 
Any other debt obligation that matures or is redeemable in one 2.0% 
year or more with a Grade 1 or 2 rating; reinsurance recoveries, 
deferred reinsurance expenses, and other reinsurance assets 
due from reinsurers with a Grade 1 or 2 counterparty rating; 
Unpaid premiums due less than six months previously, un- 4% 
closed business, any other debt obligation with a rating of Grade 
3; reinsurance recoveries, deferred reinsurance expenses, and 
other reinsurance assets due from reinsurers with a counter-
party rating of Grade 3; 
Any other debt obligations with a counterparty rating of Grade 6% 
4; reinsurance recoveries, deferred reinsurance expenses, and 
other reinsurance assets due from reinsurers with a counter-
party rating of Grade 4; 
Any other debt obligations with a counterparty rating of Grade 8% 
5; reinsurance recoveries, deferred reinsurance expenses, and 
other reinsurance assets due from reinsurers with a counter-
party rating of Grade 5; listed equity instruments (including 
subordinated debt), units in listed trusts, unpaid premiums due 
more than six months previously: 
Direct holdings of real estate, unlisted equity instruments (in- 10% 
cluding subordinated debt), units in unlisted trusts (excluding 
cash management trusts listed above), other assets not speci-
fied elsewhere in this table; 
Loans to directors of the insurer or directors of related entities 100% 
(or a director's spouse), unsecured loans to employees exceed-
ing $1,000; assets under a fixed or floating charge; 
Goodwill (including any intangible components of investments 0% 
in subsidiaries), other intangible assets, future income tax ben-
efits, assets in this category are zero weighted because they are 
deducted from Tier 1 capital when calculating an insurer's cap-
ital base; see GGN 110.1. 
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1. Alternative Liability Volatility Assumptions: The model was run 
using the Trowbridge volatility assumptions. This was to indicate 
the sensitivity of the capital requirements to a change in volatility 
based on an alternative view on the variability of business lines. 
As both sets of volatility assumptions have been proposed it is of 
interest to examine the resulting difference. 
2. Riskier Asset Mix Assumption: The model was run with the in-
surer having a significantly higher proportion of investment as-
sets in equities. This was designed to indicate the MCR required 
for insurers in the industry holding significant levels of riskier 
assets. This also allows a comparison of the significance of the 
investment capital charge for the 1MB and prescribed methods. 
3. Short Tail Insurer Assumption: The insurer was assumed to only 
sell short tail business lines. Assets and liabilities were scaled 
back to reflect the smaller overall insurer size, while all other as-
sumptions remained unchanged. Because some insurers have pre-
dominantly short tail business, this will identify the significance 
of the short tail capital charge for the comparison between the 
1MB and prescribed methods. 
4. Long Tail Insurer Assumption: The insurer was assumed to only 
sell long tail business lines. Assets and liabilities were scaled back 
to reflect the smaller overall insurer size, while all other assump-
tions remained unchanged. This will identify the significance of 
the long tail capital charge. And, 
5. Smaller Insurer Assumption: In this case the insurer was as-
sumed to have premiums equal to 2.5% of the gross written pre-
miums from the APRA statistics. The liability variability assump-
tions were adjusted according to the Tillinghast report to account 
for the smaller business size. Assets and liabilities were also 
scaled back and all other assumptions remained unchanged. 
In order to compare the 1MB and prescribed methods, it is necessary 
to allocate the MCR to lines of business. To do this we use a technique 
adopted by practitioners. Myers and Read (2001) have proposed an 
allocation of capital to lines of business based on marginal changes 
in business mix. Sherris (2004) shows that, under the assumptions of 
complete and frictionless markets, there is no unique capital allocation 
to line of business unless an assumption about rates of return or sur-
plus ratios also is made. In this case study we have set the liability 
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parameters to generate a constant rate of return across lines of busi-
ness. 
A numerical estimation procedure was used to allocate capital to 
line of business. The procedure was as follows: 
Step 1: The size of business line 1 was reduced by 1%. 
Step 2: The marginal change in the MeR was calculated, and this 
amount was allocated to business line l. 
Step 3: Steps 1 to 2 were repeated for business lines 2 to 5. 
Step 4: Steps 1 to 3 were repeated 100 times until all the business 
line sizes were reduced to zero and the MeR was reduced to 
zero. 
The capital allocated to each line was calculated as the sum of all of 
the marginal capital allocations for each line of business. Using a 1% 
reduction each time was sufficiently small so that the capital allocation 
was found to be independent of which line was reduced first. In addi-
tion, the capital allocated to each line of business is such that, as an 
additional small amount of each liability is added, the overall insurer 
one year ruin probability is maintained. This is equivalent to using the 
ruin probability for the total company as a risk measure when deter-
mining capital allocation. In other words, the capital allocated to each 
line of business is such that for the insurer the overall ruin probability 
is constant. 
6 Capital Requirements and Model Results 
6.1 Model Insurer-Base Case 
The model was run for the base case assumptions. The Prophet 
DFA model produced a distribution of insurance outcomes. For each of 
these outcomes, the amount of assets in excess of the technical reserves 
required at the start of the year to ensure that the insurer's assets are 
equal to their liabilities at the end of the year was determined. This 
represents a distribution of capital requirements. The Prophet MeR 
was determined as the 99.5 th percentile of this distribution of capital 
requirements. By taking this capital requirement, the probability that 
total assets will exceed liabilities at the end of the year will be 99.5%, us-
ing the same simulations. This value was $309.4M with a standard error 
of $1O.9M. The standard error was calculated using the Maritz-Jarrett 
method. Details of the method for computing the standard error are 
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in Wilcox (1997, Chapter 3, p. 41). The distribution of capital require-
ments is shown in Figure 1. 
Distribution of Capital Requirements 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Capital Required (t=O) 
Figure 1: Distribution of Base Case Prophet Capital Requirements 
The results of the determination of the MCR by both the internal 
model and the prescribed method are given in Table 10. As the Prophet 
DFA model does not make an allowance for credit risk, the overall MCR 
for the model insurer was determined as the sum of the internal model 
capital requirement plus the credit risk capital charge from the pre-
scribed method. This capital requirement is the MCR calculated under 
the 1MB method and is shown in Table 10. 
Table 10 
Base Case Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR) 
Comparison Between 1MB Method and Prescribed Method 
Base Case 
1MB Method 
Prophet MCR 
Adjustment for Credit Risk 
Total MCR 
1MB Standard Error 
Prescribed Method 
Total MCR 
309,396,000 
28,705,000 
338,101,000 
10,912,000 
233,323,000 
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The MCR calculated by the 1MB method was found to be significantly 
larger than the MCR under the prescribed method. The MCR calculated 
by the 1MB method represents the risk-based level of capital required 
to ensure a ruin probability in one year of 0.5%. The prescribed method 
is found to produce a capital requirement insufficient to ensure a prob-
ability of ruin over a one year time horizon of 0.5%. 
To understand each method's treatment of the various risks, we 
break down each of the MCRs by line of business and by risk type. The 
capital charge components that make-up the prescribed method's MCR 
are presented in Table 11. 
Table 11 
Prescribed Method MCR Capital Charges (in $1,OOOs) 
Motor Home F&ISR PbI. Liab. CTP Totals 
Risks 
Invest. 
Credit 
Concen. 
Liabilities 
OCLMS 
Premium 
Total 
5,314 
20,696 
2,381 
9,192 
3,740 
8,335 
10,188 
6,160 
69,667 
17,258 
36,687 
28,705 
15,000 
91,290 
61,640 
233,323 
Notes: F&ISR = Fire & ISR, Pb!. Liab. = Public Liability, Invest. = Investment, Cone en. = 
Concentration, OCLMS = Outstanding Claims Liability. 
Under the prescribed method, the total capital charges relating to 
liability risks (outstanding claims, premium, and concentration risk) 
equal $167.9M. The long tail business lines account for 61.5% of this 
charge, while the short tail lines (including fire and ISR) account for 
38.5% of the charge.? The Prophet internal model capital requirement 
was allocated to individual business lines using the numerical approach 
set out earlier. The reSUlting allocation is shown in Table 12. For the 
MCR calculated by the 1MB method, long tail lines account for 67.4% of 
capital while short tail lines (including fire and ISR) account for 32.6%. 
Although this allocation gives a slightly higher capital weighting to long 
tail lines than the prescribed method, the differences are small. 
There are, however, significant differences in capital allocations for 
each business line. The prescribed method allocates the same percent-
7The concentration risk charge is allocated only to the short tail and fire & ISR lines. 
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Table 12 
Base Case Allocation of 
1MB Method MCR to Business Lines 
Business Line 
Motor 
Home 
Fire & ISR 
Public Liability 
CTP 
Total 
Capital Allocated Percent 
In $1 ,000s Of Total 
28,291 9.1 
60,965 19.7 
11,550 3.7 
7,266 2.3 
201,323 65.1 
309,396 100.0 
age charge to both household and motor insurance. As the model in-
surer has approximately half the level of household insurance as motor 
insurance, the prescribed method capital charge is approximately half. 
The allocation of the MCR calculated by the IMB method to the house-
hold line, however, is more than double the capital allocated to the 
motor line. This is due to the higher CV of 33% for household insur-
ance vs. 22% for motor based on the Tillinghast report. The difference 
between the capital allocations under the two methods is illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
Short Tail Allocations 
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Figure 2: Relative Short Tail Capital Allocations 
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In considering these allocations of capital it is worth emphasizing 
that we are comparing a prescribed method with a method that was 
designed to ensure an equal expected rate of return to capital across 
lines of business. These differences will only be of real significance 
if company management were to use these results in their business 
strategy or decision making. In practice, these allocations are used for 
a variety of purposes including pricing as well as decisions about which 
lines of business to grow and to limit. 
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Figure 3: Relative Long Tail Capital Allocations 
For public liability and CTP insurance the prescribed method gives 
the same allocation of capital charge percentages to each of these lines 
so that the difference in the prescribed method capital charged for the 
model insurer is due to the relative sizes of the business lines (51.8% 
of capital is allocated to CTP with 9.7% allocated to public liability). For 
the internal model allocation the capital allocated to CTP is much higher 
(65.1%). For public liability it is much smaller (2.3%). 
Figure 3 illustrates the differences between the capital allocations 
under the two methods for the long tail lines. The difference in this 
case is driven largely by the diversification effects from each line. Pub-
lic liability insurance has a moderate correlation (35%) with CTP and 
zero correlation with all other business lines. This results in the public 
liability line providing large diversification benefits to the model in-
surer. CTP on the other hand is assumed to have a 50% correlation with 
motor insurance so the diversification benefits to the model insurer are 
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diminished and a higher level of capital, therefore, is allocated to this 
line. 
The prescribed method has difficulty handling correlations between 
lines of business and differences in insurer business mixes. This is 
a strength of the internal model, although the assumptions underlying 
the correlations between business lines need to be considered carefully. 
6.2 Alternative Assumptions 
Table 13 summarizes the results from the alternative assumptions. 
The table shows the capital requirements from the 1MB and prescribed 
methods for the base case and for each of the alternative assumptions. 
6.2.1 Alternative Volatility Assumptions 
Adopting the lower CVs from the Trowbridge report dramatically 
reduces the MCR calculated under the 1MB method by $214.8M. The 
internal model results are extremely sensitive to the volatility assump-
tions for the insurance liabilities. An insurer who uses the Trowbridge 
CVs for the volatility of their business will require an MeR under the 
1MB method that is Significantly lower than the MCR calculated under 
the prescribed method. Without an extensive study of liability volatility 
to validate these assumptions, it is open to insurers who can use the 
internal model approach to adopt volatility assumptions in line with 
these levels. 
6.2.2 Riskier Asset Mix 
As expected, the MCR under both the 1MB and prescribed meth-
ods increase when the insurer's proportion of invested assets in eq-
uities is increased to 80%. There is a difference in increase for each 
method, however. Under the 1MB method, the MCR increases by $61.0M, 
while under the prescribed method the increase was much less at only 
$49.0M. The capital charge for equities in the prescribed method may 
not be sufficient to allow for the impact of these securities on ruin prob-
abilities.8 Because asset risk, especially asset mismatch risk, is a major 
risk run by insurers, a prescribed method should not encourage insur-
ers to adopt a riskier investment strategy. The above result suggests 
that the prescribed method in Australia may have an incentive for in-
surers to invest in equities. 
8This is based on the assumption that TSM@ is a realistic model of asset returns. 
Table 13 
Summary of MCR Comparisons for Alternative Assumptions 
Prescribed Method MCR Capital Charges in $l,OOOs 
Base Trowbridge 80% Tail Only Small 
Case CV Equities Short Long Insurer 
1MB Method 
Prophet 309,396 94,586 370,414 209,196 228,828 139,951 
Credit Risk 28,705 28,705 28,705 10,745 12,513 5,577 
Total 338,101 123,291 399,119 219,941 241,341 145,528 
Standard Error 10,912 3,469 13,517 5,221 9,056 5,413 
Prescribed Method 
Investment Risk 36,391 36,391 85,366 9,517 22,656 9,098 
Credit Risk 28,705 28,705 28,705 10,745 12,513 5,577 
OSC Liability 91,290 88,237 91,290 7,890 80,999 28,808 
Premium Liability 61,641 59,415 61,641 30,885 23,789 15,876 
Concentration 61,641 59,415 61,641 30,885 23,789 15,876 
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It is interesting to note that had the Trowbridge CV assumptions 
been used, then changing the asset mix from 20% equities to 80% eq-
uities would have increased the MCR by a greater amount of $83.7M. 
The reason for the larger increase under the Trowbridge assumptions 
is related to the relative size of the various risks and their impact on 
ruin probability. 
The Trowbridge assumptions have lower insurance liability volatil-
ity, so that fewer of the outcomes at the 99.5 th percentile of the capital 
required distribution are due to high claims costs. Instead, the out-
comes at the 99.5 th percentile are more often due to low asset returns. 
This leads to a higher proportion of the overall capital under the 1MB 
method being attributed to asset risk when insurer liability volatility as-
sumptions are lower. This in turn creates a greater disparity between 
the prescribed method's and 1MB method's charges for asset risk. 
6.2.3 Short Tail Insurer 
Removing the long tail lines from the insurer reduces the overall 
insurer's size along with the MCR. Under the 1MB method the MCR re-
duces by $1l8.2M, while under the prescribed method the reduction is 
significantly larger at $159.3M. The internal model allocates more cap-
ital to each of the insurer's liabilities than is charged by the prescribed 
method. Rather than comparing absolute changes in MCR, it is more 
interesting to compare the relative changes. The same will hold for the 
long tail and small insurer scenarios. 
Figure 4 illustrates the MCRs under the different assumptions rel-
ative to the base case. For the short tail insurer, the 1MB method has 
a reduction in its MCR of 65% of its original size, while under the pre-
scribed method the MCR reduces to 32% of its original size. The inter-
nal model is allocating a greater amount of capital to a purely short tail 
insurer compared to the prescribed method. The reasons for this high-
light some further shortcomings of the prescribed method. By reducing 
the number of lines of business, diversification benefits are lost. This 
is accounted for in the 1MB method but not by the prescribed method, 
which has constant capital charges independent of the business mix. 
The result is that the capital calculated under the 1MB method is higher 
than under the prescribed method. 
The short tail capital charges (relative to other capital charges) un-
der the prescribed method also may charge less for the risk of those 
lines than the internal model. This would be consistent with Collings's 
(2001) finding that as an insurer increases its business mix with short 
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Figure 4: Alternative Assumptions MCRs as Percentage of Base Case 
taillines,9 it will have a relatively larger capital increase under the 1MB 
method than the prescribed method. 
This means that insurers will have an incentive to write short tail 
lines if they are using the prescribed method. If there is a relative ad-
vantage in capital required for short tail lines, this also may lead to 
underpricing of these lines. 
6.2.4 Long Tail Insurer 
In Figure 4 we note that the MCR calculated by the 1MB method re-
duces to 71% of its original size, while under the prescribed method the 
MCR reduces to 60% of its original size for the case of a long tail insurer. 
The internal model allocates a higher level of capital to a purely long 
tail insurer than the prescribed method. 
The same two effects as for the short tail insurer appear to apply 
to the case of the long tail insurer. Once again there is a loss of some 
diversification benefits for the purely long tail insurer leading to the 
higher relative MCR under the 1MB method than under the prescribed 
method. The long tail capital charges (relative to other capital charges) 
under the prescribed method charge less for the risk of those lines than 
the internal model. This is inconsistent with Collings (2001) findings 
9Collings (2001) used motor insurance as an example of a short tail line. 
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that increasing the business mix with long taillines 10 led to a greater 
relative MCR under the prescribed method than under the 1MB method. 
Regardless of the relative impact of long tail lines of business, how-
ever, it is clear that the prescribed method can not deal adequately with 
differences among business mix of insurers. Applying the prescribed 
method will lead to incentives for insurers to change their business mix 
to optimize their regulatory capital position. Lines of business with too 
low capital charges will be increased, leading to potential price cuts that 
can not be justified if proper risk allowance were to be made. 
6.2.5 Small Insurer 
Figure 4 also shows the effect of changing the size of the insurer. In 
this case the insurer is assumed to reduce to 25% of its original size. 
Under the prescribed method, the MCR reduced by a similar amount to 
32% of its original size.1 1 The percentage capital charges under the pre-
scribed method are independent of insurer size. For the 1MB method, 
while the size of the insurer decreased, the overall volatility of each of 
the business lines is assumed to increase. This is based on the assump-
tion that smaller business portfolios have greater independent variance 
and that pooling of insurer risks reduces relative volatility within a class 
of business. The volatility assumptions in an internal model should de-
pend on the size of the business line, with higher volatility assumed for 
smaller lines. The overall MCR under the 1MB method reduced to 43% 
of its original size. 
7 Risk-Based Capital Regulation of Insurers 
7.1 Impact of Volatility Assumptions 
Our results show a strong dependence of an internal model's output 
on the insurance liability's volatility assumptions. Of all the sensitiv-
ities performed, the greatest change in MCR resulted from changing 
from the original Tillinghast insurance liability CVs to the Trowbridge 
CVs. 
Insurers would be expected to prefer to have a lower regulatory cap-
ital requirement. Insurers in the industry that have liability volatility 
lOCollings (2001) used public liability insurance as an example of a long tail line. 
llThe MCR under the prescribed method did not reduce to 25% of its original size 
because the risk margins for a smaller insurer are higher and the concentration charge 
was assumed to remain constant at $15M. 
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similar to the Tillinghast CVs are unlikely to adopt an internal model to 
calculate their MCR. Insurers that have liability volatility similar to the 
Trowbridge CVs have an incentive to adopt an internal model to lower 
their MCR. As yet no insurer in Australia has elected to use an internal 
model-based approach. This may be for a number of reasons. One of 
these could be that the prescribed method produces lower capital re-
quirements than would be required if they were to adopt an internal 
model. If this were the case, then those insurers who use these lev-
els of capital to price their insurance contracts could be undercharging 
compared to the premium rate required to generate the level of ruin 
probability considered appropriate by APRA using the internal model 
approach. 
The importance of the assumed CVs in determining an insurer's MCR 
indicates a clear need for an assessment of the level of volatility across 
business lines and an understanding as to how this varies across com-
panies. Thomson (2003) commented on APRA's disappointment with 
the general lack of justification by actuaries in the risk margins they 
adopted for their first reporting under the new APRA requirements. It 
appears that Australian insurers have yet to understand fully the true 
level of volatility in their businesses and have yet to reach agreement 
on best practice in calculating volatility. This is expected to be an im-
portant issue for any regulator to address, regardless of country, in the 
introduction of risk-based regulatory capital requirements. 
7.2 Issues with the Prescribed Method 
Considering the results in Figure 4, it is evident that the prescribed 
method does not prescribe a level of capital that is adequate to ensure 
a ruin probability of 0.5% for all insurers, regardless of size or mix of 
business. This is based on the presumption that the internal model 
used in this study represents an insurer's realistic business situation. 
The model used has been developed to be close to the realistic situation 
and reflects industry best practice. The MCR calculated by the internal 
model should be representative of the actual level of capital required to 
ensure a ruin probability in one year of 0.5%. Although the IAA Insurer 
Solvency Assessment Working Party (2004) state that the prescribed 
method should be conservative to make sure that it is representative of 
all insurers that conduct business, in the Australian general insurance 
industry this does not appear to be the case. 
An important part of implementing the risk-based capital require-
ments is the calibration of the prescribed method capital charges. APRA 
calibrated the current capital charges at an industry-wide level so that 
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the total MCR of the industry increased by a factor of 1.4 to 1.5 times the 
previous level. This was a substantial increase in capital requirements 
across the industry. The impact of the changes differs between insurers 
depending on their experience relative to the industry. Insurers with 
lower volatility experience are effectively treated the same as those with 
higher volatility experience. Even if the charges are adequate for the 
average insurer, they may be inadequate for insurers with greater than 
average volatility. Assuming APRA wants to secure an industry-wide 
solvency requirement of a 0.5% ruin probability in one year, then it will 
need to increase the prescribed capital charges for insurance liabilities. 
Given that the last change in regulatory requirements increased the cap-
ital requirement in the industry by around 50%, a further increase is a 
politically contentious issue. 
This is the situation that is likely to face many regulators at an inter-
national level when they consider the introduction of these risk-based 
capital requirements. There are likely to be poorly capitalizedinsurers 
that will no longer be able to operate under these more stringent re-
quirements. At the same time capital strong insurers will be expected 
to meet the requirements. Given the difficult capital situation that has 
been faced by the insurance industry at an international level, the adop-
tion of risk-based capital for insurers may take longer and require more 
attention to capital-weak insurers than otherwise. 
An important issue for the Australian regulator will be to consider 
the liability capital charges that should be increased and to what extent. 
Collings (2001) found that short tail lines had a relatively higher capital 
requirement under the 1MB method compared to the prescribed method 
and vice versa for long tail lines. While the results from this study are 
broadly consistent with this, the differences between long tail and short 
lines are less distinct. 
At an individual line level, our internal capital allocation showed that 
the household line was allocated a significantly larger amount of capital 
than the motor line. This was driven by the higher CV assumption 
for household from the Tillinghast report. Differences in household 
and motor volatility suggest that it is inappropriate for household and 
motor to have identical capital charges. 
Differences in the capital allocations between CTP and public liabil-
ity were assumed to be driven largely by diversification effects. Smaller 
insurers and insurers with less diversified business mixes are under-
charged under the prescribed method to a greater extent than larger 
and well-diversified insurers. This strongly indicates the need to in-
clude diversification benefits in the capital requirements, concentration 
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charges for less diversified insurers, or varying capital charges based 
upon business size. 
Further sophistication to the prescribed method must be weighed 
against the benefits of simplicity in the method. It is clear, however, that 
using a prescribed method that is out of line with the actual risk-based 
capital requirements will produce incentives for insurers to behave out 
of line with the economics of the business. This is a critical issue if 
this approach leads to an incentive for insurers to underprice or grow 
riskier business lines. 
7.3 Investment Risk Capital Charges 
Our results demonstrated that the capital required for higher levels 
of equity investment was greater under the 1MB method than under the 
prescribed method. The prescribed capital charge for equities under 
the model assumptions is insufficient to cover the risk This is con-
sistent with the findings of Collings (2001) that the prescribed method 
is less responsive to increases in equity investment than is the 1MB 
method. An adequate charge to cover equity risk at the 99.5 th per-
centile would need to be larger than the current prescribed charge of 
8%,12 particularly for insurers with investment portfolios that are not 
well diversified. 
On the asset side, the prescribed method provides little incentive for 
insurers with a well-diversified investment portfolio. As an example to 
illustrate this point consider the property investment capital charge. 
The capital charge for property investment is 10%, while the capital 
charge for listed equity is 8%. For insurers that perceive there to be 
relatively higher risk-adjusted returns to be gained from equity than 
from property, there is an incentive to overweight their investment in 
equity. This is despite the fact that there can often be considerable di-
versification benefits of holding equity and property together. Collings 
(2001) provides another example by considering the diversification and 
immunization benefits of holding appropriate amounts of government 
bonds and cash. While there is an optimal amount of each of these secu-
rities to hold that minimizes overall volatility for the insurer, the capital 
charges under the prescribed method do not distinguish between the 
two asset classes and charge a constant amount of 0.5%. 
In order to ensure the MCR under the prescribed method provides 
an industry-wide solvency requirement of a 0.5% ruin probability in 
one year, APRA will need to change the investment capital charges. 
12 8% is the prescribed capital charge for listed equity securities. 
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For risky assets such as equity, the current capital charges should be 
increased. APRA also should provide inc~ntives for insurers to hold 
well-diversified asset portfolios. This could be achieved by offering 
diversification discounts or alternatively a more stringent investment 
concentration charge. 13 
7.4 Incentive to Use an Internal Model 
The opening section of APRA's capital standards states that APRA 
encourages insurers with sufficient resources to adopt an internal model 
for calculation of their MCR. APRA has a desire for insurers to begin to 
adopt the 1MB method in line with its aim for insurers to more closely 
match their capital requirements with their individual risk character-
istics. The results of the analysis of the capital requirements that we 
have undertaken indicate that there is no incentive to adopt the 1MB 
method, especially if an insurer has insurance liability CVs in line with 
the Tillinghast report. The prescribed method's capital charges would 
need to increase to the extent that the internal model would produce a 
lower MCR. Alternatively there needs to be a much closer examination 
of the volatility of insurer liabilities and a more careful calibration of 
the prescribed method capital charges. 
There are other reasons why insurers would not adopt an internal 
model for the MCR calculation. Even though risk management and mea-
surement techniques in non-life (property and casualty) insurance have 
vastly improved over the last decade and DFA modeling has become an 
important part of internal management for many large insurers, devel-
opments in these areas are still occurring. The 1MB method requires an 
internal model with a very high degree of sophistication to adequately 
address all the material risks of an insurer and their complex interre-
lationships. There also needs to be the actuarial and risk management 
human resource skills to ensure proper implementation and interpreta-
tion of results. The internal model used in this study was based on sim-
plifying assumptions, and the internal model for a real-world insurer 
would be far more complex. Even with an adequate internal model, the 
assumptions required in the model need far more careful attention. A 
greater understanding and consensus of the underlying volatility of in-
surance liabilities is a major requirement for non-life insurers in order 
to adopt an internal model for MCR calculation. 
Even as actuaries develop the necessary skills and capabilities to 
adequately implement an internal model for the 1MB method, there will 
13The current investment concentration charge only applies to Grades 4 and 5 debt 
and does not apply to concentrated holdings in other securities. 
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no doubt exist further obstacles from other stakeholders in the general 
insurance industry. The black-box stigma attached to internal models 
is likely to be an area that actuaries will need to overcome in order to 
convince general insurance senior management and the regulators to 
trust the internal model's output for management purposes and MCR 
calculation. 
Industry experts have identified another obstacle to the 1MB method. 
Financial analysts involved in the trading of general insurance company 
shares may not have the confidence in the insurer's management to 
rely on them determining their own regulatory capital requirements. 
Financial analysts may not be willing to rely upon the MCR calculated 
under the 1MB method. 
Differences in approaches to internal modeling also may make it 
difficult to compare the MCR output from one insurer's internal model 
with another insurer. Comparison across different insurers is impor-
tant for regulatory reasons and to avoid opportunistic insurers tak-
ing advantage of differences in models. Financial analysts and regula-
tors may prefer to make MCR comparisons based upon the prescribed 
method where the formula is fixed and insurer judgment does not 
impact the results. This leaves open the need to develop prescribed 
method charges that are more risk-based. 
8 Closing Comments 
8.1 Summary and Conclusions 
The IAA Insurer Solvency Assessment Working Party (2004) has ad-
vocated two methods for non-life insurers to calculate their capital 
requirement: the standard approach and the advanced approach. In 
Australia, these dual capital requirements are known as the prescribed 
method and the 1MB method. This study explores the implications of 
these new capital requirements. 
From APRA's perspective, the aim is to meet a regulatory objective 
of requiring that insurers hold a level of capital to ensure a minimum 
ruin probability across the industry. It is important that the prescribed 
method adequately charges risks to meet this objective for all non-life 
insurers licensed to do business in Australia. 
This study compared the MCRs calculated under the two methods 
and analyzed the prescribed method's capital charges using a model 
representative of industry best practice. Despite this, simplifying as-
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sumptions were made in the model's calibration. A lack of consensus 
remains as to the insurance liability volatility assumptions. 
The results of this study, however, have highlighted some significant 
issues for both regulators and insurers. For the model insurer studied, 
the MeR calculated under the 1MB method was significantly larger than 
the MeR under the prescribed method. The implication of this result 
is that despite APRA's desire for insurers to adopt an internal model 
for MeR calculation, there is an incentive for insurers to use the pre-
scribed method to produce a lower MeR. This also highlights the need 
to develop prescribed methods that are consistent with the underlying 
risk of the insurer. To do this, the need for a diversification allowance 
is very important. 
The results were shown to be highly sensitive to the insurance lia-
bility volatility assumptions. It is arguable, however, that the current 
capital charge levels in Australia are too low in order for the prescribed 
method to ensure a ruin probability in one year of less than 0.5% across 
the entire general insurance industry. This is likely to be very difficult 
to achieve. Differences between insurers of different sizes and with dif-
ferent business mixes should at least be considered more carefully in 
any revision of the prescribed method capital charges. 
There is a strong case for including either diversification benefits or 
more stringent concentration charges in the prescribed method to ad-
dress the risk reduction associated with a well diversified business mix 
and asset portfolio and to give a more consistent treatment of insurers 
with different characteristics. 
The internal model's results rely heavily on its volatility assump-
tions. There is a major need for a study to be carried out using insurer 
level data to develop a consensus in the industry as to the level of in-
surance liability volatility that should be allowed in internal models for 
capital determination. 
We can only conclude that there is much to be done by regulators 
and insurers if they are to adopt risk-based capital requirements. Some 
countries have taken a step along this path already. Australia has been 
one of the first countries to introduce a risk-based regulatory regime 
for non-life insurers, and its experience is no doubt of great interest to 
insurers, actuaries and regulators internationally. We have analyzed the 
capital requirements with a view to identifying lessons for others. There 
is still a long way to go before insurers will be in a position to confidently 
adopt the 1MB method for the MeR calculation even in Australia. 
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8.2 Areas for Further Research 
Our results depend to some extent on the degree to which the model 
and the assumptions used are representative of actual insurers. Our 
aim has been to use an internal model that broadly represents the in-
surer's business situation and parameters and assumptions based on 
industry best practice. We would expect any insurer that used a model 
similar to the one that we have used for the 1MB approach would come 
to similar conclusions. 
In this study, many simplifying assumptions were made in the model's 
calibration. We are not aware of any comprehensive study that has been 
completed that examines and assesses the appropriate insurance liabil-
ity volatility assumptions taking into account actual insurer data and 
allowing for insurer-specific characteristics. This is a critical area of re-
search required for risk-based regulatory capital if internal models are 
to be used with any confidence. 
The modeling of claims correlation is another important area for 
further research. Dependency models need to be further considered. 
Brehm (2002) outlines a formal quantitative approach for estimating 
correlation from data. The Tillinghast and Trowbridge reports use a 
much more qualitative approach. Copulas also have great potential for 
modeling insurance liability dependencies, especially for tail events. 
Despite these issues, the case study presented here identifies the is-
sues and gives guidance for any insurer considering internal modeling 
for risk-based capital. There are important lessons at an international 
level because the approach adopted in Australia is similar to that pro-
posed at the international level. 
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